Many developing countries have attempted to pursue the East Asian "growth model" in recent decades. This model is widely perceived to have been based on export-led growth. Given that developed countries are likely to grow at a slower rate and be less willing to run trade de…cits in the post …nancial crisis world, can this growth model be sustained? Using panel data for Asian countries, this paper contributes to addressing this question by distinguishing between di¤erent kinds of export-and tradableled growth in order to more precisely identify the nature of growth in the pre-crisis decades. We …nd in particular that, among our variables of interest, the proportion of a country's manufactured exports that is destined for industrialized countries is the one most robustly associated with output growth. The results have implications for continued postcrisis growth in Asian developing countries.
Introduction and Background
Growth is perhaps the foremost goal of policy makers across the world. In pursuing this objective, strategies have varied across countries, and within countries, across time. One such strategy, that of export-led growth, has been most directly associated with East Asian countries in recent decades. While, as we will see shortly, the term export-led growth could have more than one interpretation, the common thread uniting these is the hypothesis that either exports or net exports (i.e., trade surpluses) drive growth.
The original larger East Asian tigers, i.e., South Korea and Taiwan are widely believed to have pursued import-substitution policies in the earlier phases of their rapid growth experience (in the 1950s and 60s), followed by export promotion beginning in the latter half of the 60s.
1 Indeed, the pursuit of export promotion rather than import substitution, is what, according to numerous scholars, has distinguished the East Asian export performance from that of other less successful developing countries.
2 This model of export-led growth in recent years appears to have become a desirable template for many developing countries across the globe. In particular, relatively rapid growth along with current account surpluses in developing countries, especially those in the Asian region, following the Asian …nancial crisis of 1997-98 and the global recession in 2001 generated considerable interest in the potential of export-led growth. Figure 1 illustrates the weighted current account as a percentage of GDP for the 19 developed countries in our sample below (see Section 3 and Table 2 for details of the sample). 3 Unprecedented growth in China along with its accumulation of record amounts of foreign exchange reserves have only served to con…rm the perceived e¢ cacy of such a growth strategy.
Critics, however, have pointed out that the existence of a fallacy of composition or adding-up constraint undermines the sustainability and/or universal applicability of such a strategy. For one country to export more, at least one other country has to import more. A simultaneous pursuit of export-led growth by all developing countries, especially if concentrated in a similar range of manufactured products, could only be successful if demand from developed countries grows at a correspondingly rapid pace, and/or if the terms of trade move against the growing countries, thus increasing competitiveness in an imperfect substitutes framework. 4 Moreover, if the aim is to achieve growth in net exports, 1 See, for example, Weiss [2005] . 2 See, for example, Bhagwati [1990] . 3 The current account to GDP (CA-GDP) ratio was obtained for the period 1999-2009 from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) COMTRADE database for 2010 and from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) SourceOECD database for 2010. The annual weights assigned to each developed country for calculating the annual weighted CA-GDP ratio were based on the share of total manufactured exports to developed countries from the 44 Asian countries in our sample that went to that particular country that year.
In other words, we weigh the industrialized countries according to their importance as an export destination for Asian countries. 4 Barring the unlikely case where developing country products are perfect substitutes for developed country products, or where there is complete pass-through of exchange rate changes into developing country export prices when measured in domestic currency terms, a devalua-then such a strategy requires that developed countries run corresponding trade de…cits, which may beyond some point become unsustainable. Thus the strategy of export-led growth, when universally followed by developing countries, is likely to yield diminishing returns.
The recent global …nancial crisis has served to highlight the adding up constraint. For this constraint becomes even more relevant if, as widely expected, developed countries grow at a slower pace or are less willing to run trade de…cits following the recent global …nancial crisis. Put di¤erently, shrinking global imbalances in the near future may make it much harder, if not impossible, for a large group of developing countries to pursue growth based on exporting to developed countries. Indeed, another look at Figure 1 indicates that current account imbalances, have begun to shrink since the onset of global economic di¢ culties in 2007. Others, such as Rodrik [2009] , have noted, however, that Asian growth successes were based on broader tradable sector growth rather than solely on exports. Before we can evaluate prospects for the future, therefore, it would be helpful to evaluate the past. In particular, we need to clarify terms such as "export-led growth" and "tradable-led growth."
The term "export-led growth" has traditionally been understood in a Keynesian framework, whereby positive net exports or trade surpluses generate a source of demand for domestic output, and hence cause output growth. It is in this sense that the idea of an adding-up constraint makes sense. A logical corollary is that slower growth of demand and greater reluctance to run trade de…cits in developed countries will make it harder for developing countries to pursue this kind of a growth strategy. We will call this strategy the net export-led growth strategy, or NEXLG strategy. A related strand in the Post Keynesian tradition, originating with Thirlwall [1979] , points to the role of the balance of payments constraint in constraining output growth. Thus, while trade is assumed to be balanced in the long run, exports play the crucial role of facilitating growth by relaxing the balance of payments constraint. Relaxation of this constraint, in turn, facilitates imports of the investment and intermediate goods required for output growth. To the extent that trade surpluses or limited trade de…cits must precede growth, the implications are similar to those underlying the NEXLG strategy.
As discussed in the next section, a more recent strand of literature, inspired in large part by Melitz [2003] , has emphasized the role of exports as harbingers of productivity growth. The hypothesis is that greater international competition, international knowledge spillovers, economies of scale, and other relevant externalities make exports a vehicle for technological change and, hence, economic growth. What makes exports special in this case is not any external account-related consideration but rather the presence of externalities associated with the process of exporting. Thus the emphasis shifts to supply-side factors. Since the kinds of externalities discussed above are generally associated with manufactured exports, we refer to this hypothesis as the manufactured tion will translate into a deterioration in the terms of trade. In logical terms, the simultaneous pursuit of export-led growth by a number of small developing countries becomes analogous to the large country case. export-led growth strategy or the MEXLG strategy.
Another distinct hypothesis is that of what we call tradable sector-led growth or TSLG. Rodrik [2008] , for example, argues that the tradable sector, which in developing countries is associated mainly with manufactures, is typically af‡icted with market failures and institutional weaknesses to a greater extent, leading these countries to devote a sub-optimal proportion of their resources to this sector. Second-best policies to subsidize tradable production, therefore, could promote growth.
Finally, a consideration that has received much less attention is the possibility that all exports may not be created equal. Insofar as knowledge spillovers, technology transfer, and adoption of new management techniques are more likely to result from manufactured exports to developed countries, growth may also potentially be a function of the proportion of a country's manufactured exports destined for industrialized country markets. Developed country …rms, may in addition, pursue vertical foreign direct investment in low labor cost developing countries in order to use them as platforms for relatively sophisticated exports to industrialized countries, facilitating technology transfer and productivity growth in the process . We refer to this as the industrialized country-centered export-led growth strategy, or IEXLG.
The four growth strategies listed above have di¤erent implications for the post-crisis prospects for developing countries. In particular, the degree to which a global environment in which trade imbalances shrink could hamper a continuation of pre-crisis growth strategies depends on the nature of these strategies. Table 1 lays out a schematic summary of these implications. The NEXLG strategy will face greater adding-up constraints in a post-crisis world if global growth is slower, and if developed countries experience smaller trade de…cits. The MEXLG and TSLG strategies, by contrast, may not face that constraint since external imbalances are not a factor. Thus, the distinction between NEXLG on the one hand and TSLG and MEXLG on the other becomes an interesting issue. Succinctly put, developing Asia can continue to pursue TSLG but not NEXLG in a world with zero global imbalances. Moreover, the distinction between NEXLG and TSLG renders the composition of demand for domestic tradables important. For example, if there is something special about exports, then lowering wages may help the pursuit of the MEXLG strategy by freeing up domestic tradables for export. If, on the other hand, it is the entire tradable/industrial sector that is special, then lowering wages would simply shift the composition of demand from domestic to foreign sources, or, in the event that foreign demand does not displace domestic demand, may even hamper growth by lowering demand for domestically produced tradables.
5 Finally, the fact that it is the industrialized countries that are expected to shrink their overall trade de…cits in the post-crisis world has an interesting implication for the post-crisis world. Since positive net exports provide a boost to demand regardless of destination, at least some countries could continue pursuing NEXLG by substituting trade surpluses with other developing countries for those with developed countries. However, if the destination matters, say because exports to developed countries bring with them more knowledge spillovers and technological improvements to meet higher product standards, then lower export growth to these countries will hamper continuation of pre-crisis growth.
Continuing along a similar vein, a region that has pursued MEXLG will not be a¤ected in a post-crisis world characterized by zero imbalances if that state is arrived at through higher imports into that region, but it will be negatively a¤ected if that state is achieved via reduced exports to the rest of the world. To take another example, a region will be a¤ected negatively by slower developed country growth in a post crisis world if that region pursued IEXLG, but not necessarily if it pursued MEXLG and can replace exports to industrialized countries with those to other developing countries.
This paper empirically investigates the future of pre-crisis growth strategies by attempting to identify the nature of those strategies. Speci…cally, we try to econometrically distinguish between NEXLG, MEXLG, IEXLG, and TSLG using panel data for pre-crisis years. Given that export-led growth among noncommodity exporters is mainly associated with Asian countries in general, and East/South East Asian ones in particular, we focus on these countries.
We contribute to the existing literature on export-led growth and global rebalancing by distinguishing between these four growth strategies, identifying historically the most relevant ones for Asia, and thereby drawing conclusions for the future. Most interestingly, perhaps, we …nd that the proportion of an Asian developing country's exports that are destined for industrialized countries has a statistically robust positive e¤ect on output growth, and that this positive e¤ect may work through investment and imports of capital goods. This variable, to our knowledge, has not received much attention in existing literature as a determinant of growth.
Section 2 provides an overview of the main issues and related literature. The next two sections develop the empirical strategy and present the econometric estimates. Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review
The recent international …nancial crisis has served as a big shock to the global trade and …nancial architecture. As illustrated by Figure 2 , Asian countries in particular had enjoyed rapid growth and trade surpluses in the years leading to the crisis. Due to the unbalanced nature of our panel, we display the means of our variables of interest.
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The …gure highlights the trade surpluses that accompanied growth following the Asian crisis of the late nineties. Also interesting is the upward evolution, since the late seventies, of manufactured exports as a proportion of GDP and that of the proportion of manufactured exports destined for industrialized countries. The size of the industrial sector as a proportion of GDP has, on the other hand, stayed more or less the same since the mid-eighties.
The rapid growth in the years leading up to 2007 was widely perceived as having been based on surging exports. Especially impressive in this regard has been the sustained growth in China over the last three decades which has existed alongside huge current account surpluses in recent years. The logical corollary is that, given that developed countries are likely to grow at a slower pace following the crisis, and that countries with big de…cits will increasingly resort to direct or indirect protectionist measures, the pre-crisis model of growth based on exporting manufactures to developed countries may have outlived its utility.
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Discussion of the sustainability of the growth model cannot be separated from that of the nature of the growth model. Traditionally export-led growth has been interpreted to mean trade surplus-or net export-led growth. Net exports serve as a source of demand for domestic output, and hence, in a demandled growth framework, as a source of growth. The origins of the idea can of course be traced back to mercantilist literature from the pre-industrial revolution era. In its more modern form, it is most closely associated with the Keynesian framework of demand-led growth.
Export-led growth based on trade surpluses is subject to the fallacy of composition or adding up critique that becomes particularly relevant in the postcrisis world where a shortage of international demand originating from developed countries is likely. Such a constraint could either show up in the form of the crowding out of some countries'exports by other countries, or, relatedly, in the shape of deteriorating terms of trade for developing country exporters. Evidence on the existence of a fallacy of composition has thus far been suggestive although not conclusive. For example, based on panel data estimates for 22 major developing country exporters of manufacturers, Razmi [2007] …nds the presence of signi…cant demand-side constraints on export growth. Furthermore, the estimates suggest that rapid Chinese export growth has had a signi…cant impact in this regard. Eichengreen et al. [2007] con…rm the tendency for China's exports to crowd out those of other Asian countries but …nd a di¤erence in the impact of China on low income versus middle and high income Asian countries. This is because the e¤ect is felt mainly in markets for consumer goods which are exported by lower income Asian countries. China's simultaneous tendency to absorb large volumes of capital good imports from its Asian neighbors, on the other hand, has bene…ted the more advanced Asian economies.
A di¤erent basis for export-led growth was o¤ered by a strand of literature following Feder [1983] . This literature has developed the theoretical underpinnings for the inclusion of exports as an explanatory variable in a traditional growth framework with a production function. In Feder's two sector model, the output of the non-export sector depends not only on the factors of production (labor and capital) but also on exports. This captures the externality associated with factors unique to exports such as higher quality labor, internationally competitive management, etc. Moreover, the marginal product of factors in the export sector is greater than that in the non-export sector. Thus, exports, from this perspective, can potentially in ‡uence productivity and growth independently of their impact on the external balance.
More recently, several studies following Melitz [2003] , have analyzed the relationship between …rm heterogeneity, trade, and exports at a more micro level. A relevant empirical …nding is that exporting …rms tend, on average, to be larger and more productive. This suggests either that more productive …rms self-select into export markets (due to extra costs imposed by the process of exporting), and/or that …rms that export become more productive. The latter may happen due to several reasons such as economies of scale, dynamic learning, technological spillovers, and competitive pressures. Pack [2001] , for example, notes that international competition allowed purchasers abroad to exert heavy pressure on East Asian exporters, producing under contract, to cut costs and increase e¢ ciency. Exporting …rms may have easier access to new technologies thanks to their international links. Moreover, exporting …rms may receive technical guidance on how to meet higher quality standards from their clients in importing countries. Easier transfer of managerial skills may also be a factor. While empirical evidence for self-selection tends to be quite robust, that for learning-by-exporting appears to be signi…cant only for developing countries. This is not surprising since these countries tend to be farther away from the technological frontier, and hence have greater scope for learning.
Other recent studies too have pointed to the potentially special nature of exports. For example, Cypher and Dietz [2008] provide a discussion of the domestic technological learning capacity that arises from exporting manufactures. In an econometric study of nine African countries, Van Biesebroeck [2005] …nds evidence that manufactured exports facilitate productivity growth. The study shows that the presence of scale economies plays an important role in this regard. Credit constraints and contract enforcement issues prevent …rms that only produce for the domestic market from fully exploiting this channel. These problems are likely to be more relevant for developing countries, as are the potential gains from imitation. 8 The special nature of the tradable sector, which in developing countries consists mainly of the manufacturing and agriculture sectors, need not be limited to exports, however. Rodrik [2008] presents an AK-type model of endogenous 8 De Loecker [2007] …nds in an empirical study of the Slovenian manufacturing sector that export entrants become more productive once they start exporting. In a study of British manufacturing …rms, Greenaway and Kneller [2007] …nd that exporting …rms experience productivity growth relative to non-exporters. Moreover, the magnitude of divergence across industries appears to be driven by di¤erences in the scope for learning. The export e¤ect is greater, for example, if the distance to the technological frontier is large. Thus, the export e¤ect should generally be larger for low income countries. Among other recent studies, see also Hiep and Ohta [2009] for the case of Vietnamese manufacturing …rms, Mahadevan [2007] for Malaysia, and Ogunleye and Ayeni [2008] for Nigeria, and Park et al. [2009] for China. Wagner [2007] , Pedro and Yang [2009], and Silva et al. [2010] present comprehensive surveys of studies of the learning-by-exporting channel. Lall [1998] and Lall [2000] provide insightful discussions of the manufacturing export-development nexus in developing countries from a more macro perspective. growth in which the tradable sector is special in the sense that it is characterized to a greater degrees by institutional weaknesses and market failures (information and coordination externalities), leading to a bias against this sector in the allocation of resources. Second-best policies to subsidize tradable production, therefore, could promote growth.
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In a recent contribution that perhaps comes closest to the spirit of our paper, Rodrik [2009] tests the tradable-led and the export-led growth hypotheses by running a horse race between the industrial share of GDP (used as a proxy for the size of the tradable sector) and the exports to GDP ratio on the one hand and the former and trade surpluses as a proportion of GDP on the other. The panel data consists of both developed and developing countries. The paper …nds evidence that the industrial share of GDP matters more, especially for developing countries. However, since it is manufactured exports that are more likely to be the source of learning and knowledge spillovers, the manufactured exports to GDP ratio seems to be the more relevant variable, and this is the variable that we employ in our analysis.
Finally, we end this section with a brief look at another issue that is directly relevant to post-crisis prospects for developing countries. Some literature has suggested that the emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere have "decoupled" from the developed world, and are, therefore, immune to slower growth in the latter. Noting the growth in South-South trade, Canuto et al. [2010] , discuss the possible evolution of a new version of export-led growth, in which South-South trade picks up the slack through middle income countries importing more from low-income ones. The authors term this scenario "export-led growth v2.0." This, however, raises a new set of questions. Since it is the developed countries that are expected to limit their trade de…cits in the post-crisis years, is there anything special about exporting to these countries? In other words, is learning-by-exporting more signi…cant in the case of exports to developed countries, perhaps due to the presence of more stringent product quality expectations, a greater proportion of more sophisticated manufactured products in the basket, more technical guidance from client …rms, or other factors? Indeed, existing literature does provide some supportive evidence in this regard. For example, Pack [2001] notes that export-oriented production encouraged East Asian countries to move toward more sophisticated technology to meet the complex contractual requirements from Western industrial countries. De Loecker [2007] …nds that productivity gains from exporting are greater for …rms exporting to high income countries.
10 If this is the case, a (post-crisis) Export-Led Growth v2.0, which involves other developing countries replacing developed countries as export destinations, may not be a good substitute for (pre-crisis) Export-Led Growth v1.0.
We probe these issues empirically in the next section.
Data and Econometric strategy
We begin with a baseline regression of the form:
The dependent variable is the average annual rate of real (chained) GDP per capita growth, RGDP CH it 1 (real GDP per capita in the previous period) captures the convergence term, f t time speci…c e¤ects, f j country speci…c e¤ects, while " it is the error term. Real GDP growth was obtained from the Penn World Tables version 7. The GDP share of industry is denoted by Indus_P rop_GDP . Following Rodrik [2009] , among other studies, we use this as a proxy for the size of the tradable sector. The variable T B_P rop_GDP represents the trade balance as a proportion of GDP, and captures the e¤ects of net exports on growth. Manufactured exports, i.e., exports of SITC categories 5, 6, 7, and 8, as a proportion of GDP is represented by the variable M anuf _X_GDP .
Data for these four variables were obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) online database. Finally, P roportion_X_Developed is the proportion of manufactured exports destined for developed countries. Data for the construction of this variable were obtained from the United Nation's COMTRADE database.
Our sample consists of a maximum of 44 Asian developing countries, 20 industrialized countries, and the time period 1953-2009, although data are available for shorter intervals for some of the series. In order to remove short-run cyclical e¤ects, we use data averaged over three year intervals.
11 Table 2 provides a data dictionary along with a list of the countries included in the sample. We pursue a general-to-speci…c estimation strategy, which is particularly useful given our limited sample size. In each case, we …rst estimate the most general form based on equation (1). The variables that are not signi…cant at the 10 percent level are then eliminated in a step-wise manner.
Some of the variables in our sample could potentially be endogenous in the sense that these are jointly determined with the dependent variable. For example, the share of industry in the economy may not be exogenous to the GDP growth rate. Moreover, some of the variables are likely to exhibit hysteresis or persistence over time. To address the robustness of our baseline OLS estimates to potential endogeneity/simultaneity issues, we therefore, carry out dynamic panel estimations using the Arellano-Bover General Method of Moments (GMM) approach. We specify the second and third lags of the dependent variable as instruments in addition to the third lags of Indus_P rop_GDP , T B_P rop_GDP , M anuf _X_GDP , and P roportion_X_Developed. Consistent with our OLS strategy, we specify time and cross-section e¤ects, and pursue a more parsimonious speci…cation based on eliminating variables that are not statistically signi…cant. The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is employed to test the validity of our instruments.
It may be warranted here to re-visit the choice of our main variables of interest, as included in equation (1). Our focus is on exploring the nature of Asia's growth strategy. More speci…cally, whether Asian growth can be identi…ed either as tradable-led or export-led (or both), and, if so, what implications does the past pattern of growth have for a future in which slower developed country growth translates into less global demand. The motivation behind the inclusion of a proxy for the tradable sector is obvious in light of the discussion in Section 1. If, as Rodrik [2009] argues, pre-crisis Asian growth was tradable-led, then subsidies for tradable production for domestic consumption may be good substitutes for global demand in terms of boosting growth. If, however, pre-crisis growth was export-led, then this may not be true and shrinking global imbalances and/or reduced global demand become more serious concerns. The trade balance as a proportion of GDP captures Keynesian demand-side net exportled growth stimulus. As discussed in Section 1, this is only one channel -and perhaps not the most important one at that -through which exports could facilitate growth, and exports, especially manufactured ones, could be special for other reasons. This provides the grounds for including manufactured exports as a proportion of GDP and the proportion of manufactured exports destined for developed countries as explanatory variables. If exports to industrialized countries feature the bene…ts and positive externalities associated with knowledge spillovers, competition, learning-by-exporting, and quality control to a greater degree, then more limited demand from these countries in the post-crisis environment could become a signi…cant constraint on developing country growth. Table 3 provides summary statistics for the variables of primary interest. Figure 3 shows the corresponding distributions with the help of histograms.
Asia had an impressive mean growth rate of 3 per cent per year in real GDP per capita. The series ranges from a minimum of -23.5 percent (Lebanon, 1989-91) to a maximum of 20.8 percent (Azerbaijan, 2007-09) . The latter is the only observation greater than 16 percent. An overwhelming majority of the observations lie between 5 percent.
Industry as a proportion of GDP ranges from a minimum of 7.7 percent (Hong Kong, 2007-09) to a maximum of 90.2 percent (Brunei Darussalam, 1974-76) , with a mean of 34.7 percent.
12 Most of the observations lie within the 20-45 percent range. The distribution of manufactured exports as a percentage of GDP is much more skewed with most values clustered in the 0-10 percent range and very few beyond 50 percent. The full range extends from a minimum of 0.002 percent (Maldives, 2007-09) to 151.2 percent (Hong Kong, 2004-06) . Moreover there is a signi…cant di¤erence between the mean (16.6 percent) and the median (6.7 percent), indicating that a relatively small number of countries pulls the average up. Only a few values lie above the 60 percent level.
The trade balance as a proportion of GDP is centered around zero percent, as one would expect. The proportion of manufactured exports that is destined for developed countries ranges from almost zero for Bhutan in 2004-06 to almost 100 percent for Maldives in 2004-06. The former is a landlocked country that exports almost exclusively to its South Asian neighbors India and Bangladesh. Very few values lie outside the 0-60 percent range. The mean is almost 31 percent. Since Japan itself is an Asian country, albeit a high income industrialized one, we exclude it from the list of industrialized countries while calculating the series P roportion_X_Developed. As a robustness test, we also then estimate regressions with Japan included among the industrialized countries, and show that such a change does not qualitatively a¤ect our results. Including Japan, however, raises the mean of this series to 37 percent. Moreover, the inclusion of Japan makes 50-60% the most populated segment of the distribution.
Returning to our econometric analysis, once we have explored the nature of Asian growth in the past, we add additional control variables to assess the robustness of our results. Next, we brie ‡y explore possible channels through which various factors could have fostered growth. We focus on gross …xed capital formation (as a proportion of GDP) and capital goods imports (as a proportion of total imports). Investment is a channel that is widely associated with growth and technological progress, especially in the Asian case.
14 Moreover, imports of sophisticated capital goods (mainly from industrialized countries) often constitute a necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for technological upgrading and productivity growth.
1 3 There was one value that was so implausibly high that we excluded it from the outset. The trade de…cit to GDP ratio for Kazakhstan was reported as 10,133 percent for 1989-91! 1 4 On this note, see Rodrik [1995] .
Estimates

Baseline regressions
Columns (1)- (3) of Table 4 present the results of our baseline OLS regressions, proceeding from the most general form based on equation (1) to more speci…c/parsimonious speci…cations based on the strategy discussed earlier. The upper half of the table reports the individual coe¢ cient estimates while the lower half details the summed coe¢ cients along with their statistical signi…-cance (where applicable, i.e., only in the cases where more than one of the contemporary and lagged instances of a variable form part of the reported speci…cation). Consistent with standard expectations, the convergence term (LRGDP CHT ) has a negative sign and is generally signi…cant at the 1 percent level.
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The most general form in column (1) has few signi…cant coe¢ cients (the contemporary coe¢ cient of Indus_ Pr op_GDP , the …rst lagged coe¢ cient of M anuf _X_GDP , and the second lagged coe¢ cients of M anuf _X_GDP and P roportion_X_Developed). This is perhaps due to the number of lags speci…ed which limits an already somewhat small panel. Column (2) reports estimates for the more speci…c form. Only the contemporary and lagged instances of Indus_ Pr op_GDP and the twice-lagged P roportion_X_Developed survive. Thus, the latter variable tends to e¤ect growth with two lags. Moreover, the Wald test indicates that the summed coe¢ cient of Indus_ Pr op_GDP is not signi…cant at the 10 percent level. None of the instances of the other two variables T B_ Pr op_GDP and M anuf _X_GDP have a statistically signi…-cant e¤ect on output growth.
Column (3) reports the results of a regression similar to that reported in column (2), but with the lagged instance of Industry_P rop_GDP eliminated. The contemporary coe¢ cient on this variable is positive and signi…cant. The coe¢ cient on the twice lagged instance of P roportion_X_Developed is still positive and signi…cant, and somewhat larger in magnitude.
In order to facilitate comparison, column (4) presents the standardized coe¢ cients based on the speci…c regression in Column (2). The combined longrun e¤ect (sum of coe¢ cients), with a summed value of 0.246, is larger for Industry_P rop_GDP , although recall that the Wald test for joint signi…cance indicates that it is not signi…cant at the 10 percent level. Thus, the proportion of total exports to developed countries appears as the only signi…cant variable. A one standard deviation variation in this variable boosts growth by 0.175 standard deviations.
Columns (5) and (6) present the results of the robustness tests using the GMM approach, as described earlier. With this approach, we can address persistence by including the lagged dependent variable.
16 Column (5) reports the most general regression, which again yields very few signi…cant variables.
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Moving to the more parsimonious regression reported in column (6), again, the second lag of P roportion_X_Developed turns out to be signi…cant, and the e¤ect is larger than in the OLS case. The …rst lag of Industry_P rop_GDP is barely signi…cant at the 10 percent level but appears with a negative sign and a small coe¢ cient. Interestingly, …rst and second lags of M anuf _X_GDP now become individually signi…cant, although the Wald test indicates that the sum of the two variables can be rejected at traditional levels of signi…cance. The Sargan tests of overidentifying restrictions, reported for all three regressions, do not raise any concerns at the 5 percent level of signi…cance. In sum, both the OLS and GMM approaches suggest that, of the variables included in our benchmark regression, only the second lag of P roportion_X_Developed has had a positive and signi…cant long-run e¤ect on per capita GDP growth in Asian countries. The coe¢ cient on this variable is larger in the GMM regressions. The role of the share of industry in GDP is less clear, with the standardized OLS estimates showing a positive e¤ect that is larger than that of P roportion_X_Developed, but is jointly insigni…cant. The trade balance as a proportion of GDP does not appear to e¤ect growth in any of the regressions.
Taking the Asian crisis into account
As is well known, the Asian crisis of 1997-99, which began with a speculative run on the Thai Baht and quickly spread to other parts of Asia had a negative impact on income and employment. Does this e¤ect show up in our data? To explore this dimension more directly, 18 we re-ran the baseline regressions with a dummy for the period 1998-2000. Time …xed e¤ects were now excluded from the model in equation (1) for obvious reasons. Again, we estimated using both OLS and GMM techniques. Table 5 summarizes the results. As expected, the Asian crisis had a negative and signi…cant impact on Asian growth regardless of the estimation technique. The coe¢ cient on this dummy variable ranges from -0.02 to -0.04. Industry as a proportion of GDP has a negative e¤ect, although it is statistically insigni…cant in the OLS case. There is a positive and signi…cant positive contemporary e¤ect which is more than o¤set by the lagged e¤ect. Interestingly enough, the inclusion of the dummy increases the impact of the second lag of P roportion_X_Developed. This is true for both the OLS and GMM estimates, although the latter yields a larger coe¢ cient (compare columns (2) and (6) of Table 4 with columns (2) and (4) of Table 5 , respectively). In qualitative terms, the only di¤erence from the baseline regression is that the second lag of the trade balance too now becomes signi…cant, indicating that trade surpluses have a positive impact on future growth. Again, this is true regardless of the estimation technique.
Including Japan
We mentioned earlier that we excluded Japan from the list of industrialized countries while calculating the variable P roportion_X_Developed. Exports to Japan have been a major area of growth for East and South East Asian countries in particular, but also other Asian developing countries in general. Are our estimates robust to the inclusion of Japan in the list of developed countries? Table 6 addresses this question. Starting with the estimates derived without controlling for the Asian crisis (columns (1) and (2)), notice …rst that the second lag of P roportion_X_Developed continues to be positively and signi…-cantly associated with growth (see column(2)). Second, Industry_P rop_GDP too has a positive e¤ect, but just as in the baseline case (column (2) of Table 4), the overall e¤ect is statistically insigni…cant.
The other two variables representing the trade balance and the manufactured exports' share of GDP continue to be insigni…cant, as in the baseline case. The inclusion of a dummy variable for the Asian crisis increases the positive e¤ect of (twice lagged) P roportion_X_Developed, and, as in the case of Table 5 , also renders the effect of the trade balance positive and signi…cant, but the other results remain qualitatively the same. Reassuringly, the inclusion of Japan does not appear to a¤ect our results much.
Regional and Temporal Asymmetries
Much of the debate surrounding global imbalances and export-led growth has involved the East Asian tigers and the South East Asian export dynamos that followed their lead in what is sometimes called a " ‡ying geese" formation. Do these countries behave di¤erently than the rest of Asia in terms of our main variables of interest? In order to explore this possibility, we divided the sample into East and South East (ESE) countries on the one hand and the rest of Asia (ROA) on the other. Columns (1)-(4) of Table 7 summarize the estimates derived for these groups. Focusing again on the parsimonious form estimates (columns (2) and (4)), there is some evidence of di¤ering behavior. While the industry share of GDP and the proportion of exports destined for industrialized countries both play a positive and statistically signi…cant role in boosting real per capita GDP growth in the ESE countries, that appears not to be the case for the ROA countries, where only the coe¢ cient on the former variable is positive and signi…cant. As is generally the case with our previous regressions, the trade balance and share of manufactured exports are either insigni…cant and/or have a negative impact on output growth. Thus, the main …nding reported by Rodrik [2009] , that is, the existence of a positive association between the share of the industrial/tradable sector holds for both groups of countries. However, we …nd that, for East and South East Asian countries at least, the proportion of exports destined for industrialized countries too is an important driver of growth. These results provide some suggestive evidence for the widely perceived export-and tradable-led basis of East and South East Asian growth.
Columns (5)- (8) present results for regressions run with the sample period split into two overlapping periods, 1953-1995 and 1989-2009 . The periods were allowed to overlap in order to have evenly split and reasonably large subsamples. 19 Our general …nding that the proportion of exports sold in industrialized country markets is robustly and positively associated with output growth holds only for the second sub-period (again, as always, with two lags). For the …rst sub-period, however, Industry_P rop_GDP and M anuf _X_GDP are signi…cantly and positively associated with growth. The trade balance variable is negative and insigni…cant in both cases. Thus, the proportion of exports destined for industrialized countries appears to have mattered only in recent decades. Given the small sizes of the sub-samples, however, this evidence should only be seen as suggestive and preliminary. Table 8 addresses potential concerns raised by the presence of outliers. One such concern is that our results could be driven by a handful of high income oil exporting countries. Suppose, for example, that commodity exporters have, on average, a lower proportion of exports destined for developed countries. Since some of these countries are high income, and since high income countries may, on average, grow slower, this introduces a bias in favor of …nding a positive impact of P roportion_X_Developed. Figure 4 highlights this concern. The points to the right of the 50,000 level of real per capita GDP almost exclusively represent observations for Qatar and Brunei Darussalam, two relatively small oil and gas exporting countries. Moreover, these two countries have a relatively low proportion of exports destined for developed countries. Notice …rst that his concern should be addressed in principle by our inclusion of a convergence term. Second, as seen in Figure 5 , the negative correlation between RGDP CH and P roportion_X_Developed almost vanishes once we restrict the sample to countries below the $20,000 threshold of real per capita GDP. Re-running our OLS regression with this more limited sample delivers results similar to our baseline regression that includes all data points (compare column (2) of Table 4 and column (2) of Table 8 ). One somewhat minor di¤erence is that, the …rst and second lags of M anuf _X_GDP now survive the reduction to a parsimonious form, although their sum is negative and jointly insigni…cant (as indicated by Wald tests). 20 The only other di¤erence is that the contemporary and lagged coe¢ cients of Industry_P rop_GDP now become jointly signi…cant at the 10 percent level (and remain positively signed). Thus both the proportion of exports to industrialized countries and the GDP share of the industrial sector now become positive and statistically signi…cant determinants of per capital output growth.
Excluding outliers
As discussed earlier, and as highlighted by Figure 3 , a few small open economies in our sample (mainly Singapore and Hong Kong but also Macao and Malaysia) have exceptionally high proportions of manufactured exports as a share of GDP. Could these historically fast growing economies be driving our results? Columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 present the estimates derived once we limit the sample to values of M anuf _X_GDP less than or equal to 60 percent. Again the results are very similar to our baseline OLS regression, the Wald test of joint signi…cance indicating that the summed coe¢ cient on Indus_ Pr op_GDP is insigni…cant (compare column (2) of Table 4 and column (4) of Table 8 ). The coe¢ cients on P roportion_X_Developed are identical in magnitude (and signi…cant) in both cases. Finally, we noticed while discussing Figure 3 that a few countries export almost entirely to developed countries. Could these countries be driving our results? To investigate this aspect, we re-estimate our baseline growth equation after excluding data points with Pr oportion_X_GDP greater than 60 percent. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 8 present the results. Once again the estimates are very similar to those derived for the full sample (see column (2) of Table 4 ). The summed coe¢ cient of Industry_P rop_GDP is not statistically signi…cant, leaving P roportion_X_Developed as the only signi…cant and positive in ‡uence on real per capita GDP growth.
Controlling for Possible Omitted In ‡uences
So far we have investigated factors that could help us gauge prospects for the future of tradable-and export-led growth in Asia. We found P roportion_X_Developed to be the most robust correlate of growth. Now we brie ‡y explore the e¤ects of other control variables that are typically included in growth regressions as determinants of growth. We add twice lagged values of four variables to a baseline regression: (1) openness (OP EN C), as measured by the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP, (2) savings as a proportion of GDP (SAV _GDP ), government expenditure as a proportion of GDP (GG), and the terms of trade (T OT ). The use of twice lagged instances is designed to avoid endogeneity problems.
21 Data for T OT , GG, and SAV _GDP came from the WDI while that for OP EN C was obtained from the Penn World Tables (version 7) . We pursue the GMM approach to address the presence of lagged GRGDP CH on the right hand side. Also, we only introduce one control variable at a time in order to conserve degrees of freedom. Table 9 summarizes the results. Positive terms of trade shocks and an increase in the saving to GDP ratio have a small positive e¤ect on output growth, although both are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Greater openness has a small negative e¤ect, although again it is statistically insigni…cant. The coe¢ cient on government spending is small, negative, and signi…cant. The coe¢ cient on our main variable of interest, i.e., P roportion_X_Developed, remains positive and statistically signi…cant with one exception. It becomes insigni…cant when the terms of trade variable is included. This latter result may be driven by the small sample size (recall that the terms of trade variable is insigni…cant too; we only have terms of trade data post-1980).
Potential channels for capital accumulation and technological progress
The East Asian growth model has often been associated with not only rapid export growth but also high investment. Indeed, some analysts have termed rapid Asian growth as export-and investment-led. The investment angle may be particularly important if capital goods, especially sophisticated ones, embody technological progress. It could, for instance, be the case that countries that export more manufactures to industrialized countries have to ensure higher quality through investment in domestic and imported capital goods. As a preliminary step toward exploring these possibilities, we estimate a regression of the following form:
where, depending on the equation estimated, X denotes either GF CF _ Pr op_GDP (…xed capital formation as a proportion of GDP) or K_ Pr op_T otal_ Im ports (capital goods imports as a proportion of total imports). Table 10 provides the estimation results for the speci…c equation in both non-standardized and standardized forms (columns (1) and (3), and columns (2) and (4), respectively). A look at column (1) suggests that a positive trade balance is negatively associated with investment as a proportion of GDP, although the twice lagged instance has a small positive e¤ect. The negative contemporary e¤ect, which dominates, may indicate the heavy imported good content of Asian growth. Not surprisingly, industry as a proportion of GDP has a positive and signi…cant impact on investment. Much less recognized in existing literature is the positive and signi…cant e¤ect on investment of the share of exports to industrialized countries. This is consistent with the hypothesis that exports to industrialized countries require more sophisticated production processes, and hence more investment. A look at the standardized coe¢ cients in column (2) indicates that the normalized e¤ect of the industrial share of GDP is greater than that of P roportion_X_Developed. Column (4) presents the parsimonious form estimates with K_P rop_Imports as the dependent variable. Somewhat surprisingly, industry as a proportion of GDP does not appear to signi…cantly a¤ect the proportion of capital goods imported. However, the share of manufactured exports does have a positive and signi…cant impact. Moreover, the lagged value of the trade balance and the proportion of exports destined for industrialized countries have important roles to play too, in terms of both statistical signi…cance and economic magnitude. This latter …nding provides more empirical support for the hypothesis that exports to industrialized countries require more advance production processes that typically require imported capital goods.
In sum, Table 10 provides suggestive evidence for at least two channels underlying the positive e¤ect of P roportion_X_Developed on growth. This variable appears to have a positive relationship to both investment as a proportion of GDP and the share of capital goods in total imports.
Conclusions and Implications
Our e¤ort involves a rather ambitious question; is it likely that Asian countries will be able to pursue the pre-crisis patterns of rapid growth? To help tackle this question, one …rst needs to establish the characteristics of pre-crisis growth. We have attempted to explore the trade-and export-related characteristics. More speci…cally, to what extent was Asian growth tradable sector-led, net exportled, or export-led in some other sense. As we have stressed, the answers have implications for a future in which industrialized countries are likely to grow at a slower pace and global external account imbalances are likely to shrink.
We ran a series of growth regressions to derive OLS and GMM estimates, to test robustness for sub-samples and to the exclusion of outliers, to control for possible in ‡uences missing from our benchmark regressions, and to explore possible transmission channels. Our main …nding is that, among our variables of interest, the proportion of total Asian country exports destined for industrialized countries is the most robust correlate of real per capita GDP growth. The industrial share of GDP, used as a proxy for the size of the tradable sector, is positively associated with growth too -indeed the standardized coe¢ cient in the baseline regression is larger than that for the share of exports destined for industrialized countries -but the overall e¤ect is statistically insigni…cant in most cases. The other two variables of interest, that is, the share of manufactured exports in GDP and the trade balance as a proportion of GDP generally appear to play no signi…cant role in promoting output growth in Asian countries. We …nd some suggestive evidence that the proportion of exports destined for industrialized countries may have mattered more for the East and South East Asian countries, a group that is distinguished by its high growth rate over past decades. We also …nd some preliminary evidence that countries that export more to developed countries have a higher share of GDP devoted to investment and a higher share of capital goods in imports.
It is perhaps not surprising that, for developing countries that are well inside the technological frontier, manufactured exports to industrialized countries can facilitate growth through knowledge and technology spillovers and the e¤ects of international competition. Indeed our main …nding is consistent with the body of recent literature that has found some evidence for exports leading to productivity growth. Most of this literature, however, is based on …rm-level data. We, on the other hand, …nd evidence at the macroeconomic/national level. Moreover, we …nd suggestive evidence that two channels through which exports to industrialized countries may facilitate growth are those of investment and the import of capital goods from these countries.
These …ndings have some important implications for the post-crisis global economic architecture. To the extent that our …ndings suggest some role for the size of the tradable sector in promoting growth, the post-crisis world could still witness rapid growth in Asian countries, albeit one based on the growth of tradable production for domestic consumption rather than exports. Industrial policy such as subsidies for tradable production will then have to substitute for export subsidies. Furthermore, policies that penalize domestic consumption in order to generate exports will have to be reversed in the face of shrinking external demand. Shrinking global imbalances need then not be a pressing concern.
Our …nding that the proportion of exports sold to industrialized countries is, among our variables of interest, the most robustly (and positively) associated with growth, however, has less sanguine implications. Since pre-crisis global imbalances largely involved industrial country trade de…cits, a shrinking of such imbalances will almost certainly require a decline in these de…cits. In principle such de…cits could decline through greater industrialized country export growth without a fall in import growth. However, add to this the near certainty that slow industrialized country income growth will cause demand from these countries to grow at a slower clip, and we get the important implication that Asian exports to industrialized countries are likely to decelerate, which in light of our main …nding, is a cause for concern. Put di¤erently, the fact that tradable production for domestic consumption may not be good substitutes for exports to industrialized countries magni…es the challenges facing sustained Asian growth in the coming years. Export-led growth v2.0 in this sense may not be a good substitute for export-led growth v1.0.
Our study has focused on the growth determinants that relate to tradable and exportable sector issues. A more exhaustive analysis, beyond the scope of our study, will incorporate other variables that are typically seen as causing or hampering growth. It might be interesting too to extend the analysis to investigate whether other developing countries behave di¤erently than the Asian sample that we analyzed. We hope to pursue these questions in future work. 
